


We would like to announce:

We would like to announce:


Passwords are finally DEAD!!!



We would like to announce:

Passwords are finally DEAD!!!


Not like when Bill Gates said that,



We would like to announce:

Passwords are finally DEAD!!!

Not like when Bill Gates said that,
and Google claimed that, and...




We would like to announce:

Passwords are finally DEAD!!!

Not like when Bill Gates said that,
and Google claimed that, and...

But really really dead




We would like to announce:

Passwords are finally DEAD!!!

Not like when Bill Gates said that,
and Google claimed that, and...

But really really dead
Pushing up daisies



We would like to announce:


Passwords are finally DEAD!!!

Not like when Bill Gates said that,
and Google claimed that, and...

But really really dead

Pushing up daisies

But we can't ☹️



How to (**not**) Share a Password:
Privacy preserving protocols for finding
heavy hitters with adversarial behavior

Moni Naor

Benny Pinkas

Eyal Ronen

Compromise a User, Attack the Eco System

- Bad passwords do not only compromise the users
- Weak and popular passwords can be used for large scale attack
 - E.g. the Mirai attack
 - Easy to find IoT devices with Shodan like search engines
- Service provider liability?

Possible solutions



Panacea

Greek Goddess of
Universal Remedy

Solution to all
problems; **Cure-all**



Possible solutions



- Our suggestion - Blacklist Popular passwords

Passwords over time

- password -> passw0rd -> p@assw0rd->password
- superman -> wonderwoman
- Different populations

Passwords over time

- password -> passw0rd -> p@assw0rd->password
- superman -> wonderwoman
- Different populations



Primum non nocere

First do (almost) no harm

Primum non nocere

First do (almost) no harm

- Publishing password blacklist can also **help attackers**
 - Publishing the blacklist is like publishing a **code vulnerability**

Primum non nocere

First do (almost) no harm

- Publishing password blacklist can also **help attackers**
 - Publishing the blacklist is like publishing a **code vulnerability**
- Leaking password information can **hurt the user**
 - One bit leakage doesn't hurt the user a lot
 - Differential privacy can also help

How to (not) share a Password

- Identify and **blacklist** popular passwords (**heavy hitters**)
 - those were chosen by more than a fraction τ of the users
- Server should not learn more than 1 bit on any user's password
 - At most halves the number of password guesses
- Probability of False Negative (pFN) must be **negligible**
 - No popular password is missed
- Probability of False Positive (pFP) may be a small value
 - A legitimate password can be rejected with low probability

Previous work

- Privately Finding heavy hitters in many settings - [DNP+10, DNPR10, CSS11, CLSX12, DNRR15]
- Semi-honest version [BS15, BNST17]
- Non colluding mix servers – [MS17]

- DP password list with **trusted server** – [BDB16]
- Similar motivation, no DP – [SHM10]

The Malicious world

- Both **users** and **server** might be malicious
- A malicious **server** wants to learn the passwords
- Malicious **users** want to “hide” popular passwords
 - **Adversary controls a coalition of users**

Implementation and other usages

- We implemented the full malicious QR protocol on a RPi
 - Non interactive version runs in about 15 seconds, can run in background
 - Server computer can verify in about 0.5 seconds
- Same solution can be used in any heavy hitter problem with possible malicious setting
 - **TOR network statistics**
 - **Device PIN/Pattern**
 - **Large service providers dynamic passwords statistics**

eprint.iacr.org/2018/003